From Pill-Counting to Patient Care: Pharmacists\u27 Standard of Care in Negligence Law by Fleischer, Lauren
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 68 Issue 1 Article 5 
1999 
From Pill-Counting to Patient Care: Pharmacists' Standard of Care 
in Negligence Law 
Lauren Fleischer 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Lauren Fleischer, From Pill-Counting to Patient Care: Pharmacists' Standard of Care in Negligence Law, 68 
Fordham L. Rev. 165 (1999). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol68/iss1/5 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
From Pill-Counting to Patient Care: Pharmacists' Standard of Care in Negligence 
Law 
Cover Page Footnote 
I wish to thank Carolyn and William Fleischer for supporting my endeavors, academic and otherwise. 
This article is available in Fordham Law Review: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol68/iss1/5 
FROM PILL-COUNTING TO PATIENT CARE:
PHARMACISTS' STANDARD OF CARE IN NEGLIGENCE
LAW
Lauren Fleischer'
INTRODUCrION
The pharmaceutical industry has faced a spike in civil litigation over
the last twenty years.' Some customers are asking the judiciary to
hold pharmacists accountable for failing to use their position in the
healthcare system to protect customers from drug-related injuries!
Generally, plaintiffs allege that pharmacists have a common law duty
to take corrective measures, such as refusing to fill or to warn the phy-
sician or patient about a potentially dangerous prescription? They ar-
gue that this duty arises if a prescription has obvious inadequacies,
such as incomplete directions;4 if it calls for excessive dosages or quan-
tities;5 if it is refilled at an uncommonly high rate, indicating the cus-
tomer's possible misuse of the drug;6 or if it causes serious side effects,
such as interaction or addiction.7 Plaintiffs base other claims on the
* I wish to thank Carolyn and William Fleischer for supporting my endeavors,
academic and otherwise.
1. See e.g., Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 516 (Ind. 1994)
(discussing a tort action brought by a pharmacy customer); Guillory v. Dr. X, 679 So.
2d 1004, 1006 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (same); Riff v. Morgan Pharmacy, 508 A.2d 1247,
1248 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986) (same); Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380, 381 (Tenn. Ct.
App. 1990) (same); McKee v. American Home Prods., 782 P.2d 1045, 1047 (Wash.
1989) (same).
2. See infra Part H.B.2.
3. See e.g., Lasley v. Shrake's Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129, 1130
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994) (holding that defendant-pharmacist had a duty to warn either
plaintiff or his physician about dangers of prolonged drug use).
4. See Riff, 508 A.2d at 1252 (holding defendant-pharmacist negligent for not
clearly indicating the maximum safe dosage on the label when filling migraine medi-
cation prescription).
5. See e.g., Jones v. Irvin, 602 F. Supp. 399,402 (S.D. I1. 1985) (explaining plain-
tiff's argument that defendant-pharmacist should have warned the patient or physi-
cian that the prescription called for drugs in dangerous amounts, and that the drug
quantities were likely to cause interactions).
6. See e.g., Hooks, 642 N.E.2d at 519 (holding that defendant-pharmacist had a
duty to refuse to fill a prescription that customer was requesting at an unreasonably
faster rate than prescribed).
7. See e.g., Guillory v. Dr. X, 679 So. 2d 1004, 1006 (La. Ct. App. 1996) (finding
no duty to warn patient that prescriptions from various treating doctors were contra-
indicated).
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pharmacist's actual knowledge of the danger,' or a voluntary assump-
tion of a heightened duty.9 The majority of courts, however, have re-
jected plaintiffs' claims that under negligence law a pharmacist has a
duty to take corrective steps under such circumstances. 10
Plaintiffs' heightened expectation of a pharmacist's duty follows the
trend in personal injury litigation that favors plaintiff recovery." For
example, most jurisdictions have replaced the defense of contributory
negligence with comparative negligence,'12 allowing plaintiffs to re-
cover damages in spite of their own negligence. 13 Some courts have
held manufacturers strictly liable for injuries their products caused to
consumers, partially because of the consuming public's trust and reli-
ance in goods marketed by sophisticated producers. 4 Injured custom-
ers, and the tort system that protects and compensates them, expect
recovery from any party that could have prevented the harm, and
public policy favors such recovery if it encourages the exercise of rea-
sonable care and deters future injuries."
The shift in pharmacist liability is appropriate and proportionate to
the risk inherent in prescription drugs. Courts in determining the
proper scope of contemporary pharmacist liability must contend with
the extremely narrow, traditional concept of a pharmacist's duty, re-
quiring clerical accuracy 16 but little else. While many courts accept
this traditional standard of care and dismiss plaintiffs' claims, some
apply a heightened standard. 7
The academic response to the question of pharmacists' liability in
negligence has criticized both decisions that limit liability by adopting
8. See, e.g., Hand v. Krakowski, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121,123 (App. Div. 1982) (finding
a duty to warn alcoholic customer that drug was contraindicated with use of alcohol).
9. See Baker v. Arbor Drugs, Inc., 544 N.W.2d 727, 731 (Mich. Ct. App. 1996)
(holding that a pharmacy had a duty to correctly use its computer system that was
voluntarily installed and advertised as a safety measure for customers' safety).
10. See, e.g., Roseann B. Termini, The Pharmacist Duty to Warn Revisited: The
Changing Role of Pharmacy in Health Care and the Resultant Impact on the Obliga-
tion of a Pharmacist to Warn, 24 Ohio N.U. L. Rev. 551, 565 (1998) ("Courts remain
reluctant to impose a legal duty on a pharmacist to provide unsolicited information to
patients.") (footnote omitted).
11. See Marc A. Franklin & Robert L. Rabin, Tort Law and Alternatives 389 (5th
ed. 1992) (noting the flood of comparative negligence legislation as part of the
"growing unhappiness with the harshness of contributory negligence").
12. See id.
13. See, e.g., Li v. Yellow Cab Co., 532 P.2d 1226, 1244 (Cal. 1975) (replacing the
common law defense of contributory negligence with comparative negligence).
14. See, e.g., Escola v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 150 P.2d 436, 443 (Cal. 1944)
(Traynor, J., concurring) (observing that the consumer's "vigilance has been lulled by
the steady efforts of manufacturers to build up confidence by advertising and mar-
keting devices").
15. See Bill Hotopp, Hook's SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin: Pharmacists' Duty To-
ward Their Patients, 6 J. Pharmacy & L. 35, 40 (1996).
16. Clerical accuracy refers to technical precision in filling the prescription. See
infra note 23 and accompanying text.
17. See infra Part II.B.2.
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the traditional view, and decisions that expand the scope of pharma-
cist liability. Commentators argue that in both situations courts have
failed to properly consider the practices and customs of the industry,
and instead have imposed judicially created standards in determining
whether to impose liability."8 The inconsistency stems from courts'
treatment of pharmacists as ordinary negligence defendants. Were
courts to recognize pharmacists as professionals, they would instead
defer to the industry and relevant community to determine the appli-
cable standard of care. 9 By doing so, pharmacists would be exposed
to a consistent level of liability, which would be governed by the in-
dustry rather than by the judiciary. Recognizing pharmacists as pro-
fessionals would serve to protect them from unpredictable judgments
while holding them to industry standards as determined by profes-
sional negligence law.
Part I of this Note describes society's traditional view of the phar-
macist as primarily a technician. This part then presents contempo-
rary views of the pharmacist's changing role, views which rely on
pharmacists' training to benefit and protect customers. Part IE exam-
ines the standard of care applied to other types of professionals in
malpractice suits. This part demonstrates that the procedures and
privileges afforded to professionals in such suits provide consistency
and fairness in finding liability. It then discusses the spectrum of li-
ability that courts have applied to pharmacists, by contrasting jurisdic-
tions that traditionally dismiss complaints against pharmacists with
courts that either permit the trier of fact to determine the standard of
care or to impose judicially created minimum standards of care. Part
Ill argues that courts have been reluctant to expand the scope of
pharmacists' responsibilities and thus their liability toward customers.
Expansion of negligence liability should follow rather than precede
court recognition of pharmacists as professionals. This Note con-
cludes that by treating pharmacists as professionals for purposes of
negligence suits, courts better serve the interests of both potential
plaintiffs and the pharmaceutical industry.
& See Jones v. Irvin, 602 F. Supp 399, 402 (S.D. Ill. 1985) (holding that a phar-
macist has no duty to warn the customer or notify the physician that the customer is
receiving dangerous amounts of the prescribed drug). But see Hooks SuperX, Inc. v.
McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 519 (Ind. 1994) (imposing a duty on a pharmacist to
cease refilling prescription for customers seeking refills at an unreasonably fast rate).
19. See infra Part H.A.
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I. THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE PHARMACIST
This part presents the traditional legal view of the pharmacist as a
clerical technician, and then describes the more progressive
approaches to pharmacy that acknowledge the independence of the
profession and the resources it offers to patients and customers.
A. The Traditional View of Phannacists' Liability
The liability of pharmacists traditionally rests on the pharmacist's
responsibility to accurately fill valid prescriptions as directed by the
treating physician. Under this traditional view, the pharmacist's role
is predicated on the physician-patient relationship. 0 Interference with
this relationship by the pharmacist is discouraged, as patients are ex-
pected to rely entirely on the prescribing physician to convey all ap-
propriate warnings regarding drug therapy.21 Because only the physi-
cian is familiar with the patient's medical condition, and can
determine best which warnings are relevant to the patient, additional
warnings by the pharmacist could confuse the customer or dissuade
him from continuing the drug therapy.22
Viewed essentially as a technician, the traditional pharmacist fo-
cused on accuracy and efficiency in dispensing drugs.23 A pharmacist's
job was nonjudgmental, involving little discretion in fulfilling his du-
ties.2 In fact, the 1952 Code of Ethics for the industry expressly dis-
couraged pharmacists from advising customers about drugs and drug
therapy, even when a customer sought such information.' Instead,
the pharmacist was advised to counsel the customer to contact the
20. See, e.g., Hotopp, supra note 15, at 41 (charging the physician alone with the
duty to prescribe, authorize and monitor drug use, and refuting any independence of
the pharmacist-customer relationship from that of the physician).
21. This is the rationale behind the "learned intermediary doctrine." Originally
developed as a defense for drug manufacturers, the doctrine obligates only the physi-
cian to warn patients about potential side effects associated with drug therapy. See
Reyes v. Wyeth Lab., 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir. 1974); Presto v. Sandoz Pharms.
Co., 487 S.E.2d 70, 73 (Ga. Ct. App. 1997).
22. See Kirk v. Michael Reese Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 513 N.E.2d 387, 395 (II1. 1987)
(adopting the learned-intermediary doctrine as a bar to claims against a pharmacist
for failure to warn customers).
23. See Alison G. Myhra, The Pharmacist's Duty to Warn in Texas, 18 Rev. Litig.
27, 30 (1999) (discussing the "no mistakes allowed" approach of traditional phar-
macy).
24. See id. at 34; David B. Brushwood, The Professional Capabilities and Legal
Responsibilities of Pharmacists: Should "Can" Imply "Ought"? 44 Drake L. Rev. 439,
444-45 (1996) [hereinafter Brushwood, Professional Capabilities].
25. See Code of Ethics, 13 J. Am. Pharm. Ass'n Practical Pharmacy Ed. 722 (1952)
(cited in David B. Brushwood, The Pharmacist's Duty to Warn: Toward a Knowledge-
Based Model of Professional Responsibility, 40 Drake L. Rev. 1, 17 n.74 (1991)
[hereinafter Brushwood, Knowledge-Based Model]).
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prescribing physician 6
B. The Modem Approach to Pharmacy
Injured customers, as evidenced by litigation of the last twenty
years, believe that pharmacists should play an important role in the
healthcare safety netY Not everyone agrees. Today, pharmacists
struggle against the traditional perception that they simply move pills
from one bottle to the other.8 Many states do not even classify phar-
macists as healthcare professionals.O Even in states that have statutes
defining the practice of pharmacy, the courts apply these statutes to
institutional, but not neighborhood, pharmacistsO
But the pharmaceutical industry is not confined to pill-counting.
For example, HMOs employ pharmacists on committees that decide
which drugs most effectively and efficiently treat ailments, and create
"formulary" lists from which doctors can prescribe drugs for their pa-
tients.3 Thus, pharmacists play a vital role in determining the success
or failure of drugs.32
In the early 1990s, Congress demonstrated its recognition of phar-
macists' impact on the quality of patient care by enacting legislation
intended to minimize adverse drug therapy outcomes.n The Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 ("OBRA-90") requires states to
take advantage of a pharmacist's unique position to promote success-
ful drug therapy, in part by requiring pharmacists to provide better in-
formation to patients.3 This new legislation expands pharmacy prac-
26. See id.
27. See infra Part II.B.2.
2& See Paul Hochman, The Real Power in Health Care: WHY DRUG
COMPANIES FEAR AND LOATHE PHARMACISTS, Fortune, Mar. 29, 1999, at
46.
29. See id. (quoting Bill Fitzpatrick, Corporate Compliance Officer at pharmacy-
operator Omnicare).
30. See McKee v. American Home Prods., 782 P.2d 1045, 1052 (Wash. 1989). To
support her claim, the plaintiff in McKee cited a Washington statute as evidence of a
statutory duty to warn plaintiff about the dangerous propensities of prescribed drugs.
See id. (citing Wash. Rev. Code § 18.64.011(11) (West 1989)). The statute defines the
practice of pharmacy as including- monitoring of drug therapy and use; modifying
drug therapy; and providing information on drugs, such as advising of therapeutic
values and hazards. See ri. at 1051-52. The court observed that the statute is defini-
tional rather than prescriptive, and read it in conjunction with another statute that
states that "monitoring drug therapy" includes measuring patient vital signs and or-
dering diagnostic tests. See id. at 1052 n.6 (citing Wash. Admin. Code § 360-12-150
(1987)). Because the court determined that the latter provision applied only to phar-
macists employed in institutional settings and not to neighborhood pharmacists, it re-
jected the plaintiff's claim that the statute obligated the defendant-pharmacist to warn
her about long-term effects of her prescription. See id. at 1052.
31. See Hochman, supra note 28.
32 See id.
33. See Ominbus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L No. 101-508, 104
Stat. 1388-151 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g) (1994)).
34. See Tara L. Furnish, Departing from the Traditional No Duty to Warn: A New
1999]
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tice to include an obligation to screen prescriptions, keep patient his-
tory records, and offer to discuss medications with Medicaid pa-
tients.3 1 OBRA-90 obligated states to implement the programs by
January 1, 1993, as a condition to receiving prescription drug reim-
bursement from Medicaid.3 6 Though states were required to imple-
ment these programs only in regard to Medicaid patients, most states
exceeded the mandate by applying the standards industry-wide. 37
The pharmaceutical industry itself has acknowledged its ability to
improve drug therapy and minimize avoidable injuries. Pharmacists
now advertise their caretaker potential and invite the public to take
advantage of expanded services.3 1 Pharmacies such as Rite-Aid and
Arbor Drugs advertise that their customers stay free from unwanted
side effects because their pharmacists screen multiple prescriptions for
possible contraindication. 39 An advertisement from Arbor Drugs, for
example, entices customers by stating: "How can you avoid harmful
drug interactions? Simple. Get your prescriptions filled at Arbor
Drugs where Arbortech Plus provides your Arbor pharmacist with
your complete medical history, so we're aware of any possible medica-
tion interactions. 40
The industry's willingness to accept an expanded role in treating
customers is further demonstrated by a national study on the activities
of pharmacists4 a reported in the Standards of Practice. 2 Intended to
Trend for Pharmacy Malpractice?, 21 Am. J. Trial Advoc. 199, 199 (1997).
35. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g)(2)(A)(ii).
36. See id. § 1396r-8(g)(1)(A).
37. See Patient Counseling Requirements: A State-by-State Compilation of Statu-
tory and Regulatory Provisions Enacted in Response to the Mandates of the Omnibus
Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990 (National Association of Boards of Pharmacy,
Chicago 1993) (cited in David B. Brushwood, The Pharmacist's Duty Under OBRA-
90 Standards, 18 J. Legal Med. 475, 485 n.44 (1997) [hereinafter Brushwood, Duty
Under OBRA-90]).
38. See, e.g., Richard M. Eldridge & Michael F. Smith, Baker v. Arbor Drugs, Inc.:
Pharmacists Beware of Voluntarily Assuming the Duty to Protect Against Harmful
Drug Interactions, 14 J. Contemp. Health L. & Pol'y 41, 41, 50 (1997).
39. See id. Contraindication is a condition that makes unadvisable a particular
treatment.
40. Baker v. Arbor Drugs, Inc., 544 N.W.2d 727, 731 n.1 (Mich. 1997) (providing
examples of pharmacy advertisements regarding customer services). The advertise-
ment is clearly intended to attract customers. When one considers statistics such as
the 3000 independent pharmacies that went out of business over two years because of
their inability to compete with larger pharmacies, these advertisements do not neces-
sarily illustrate that all pharmacists believe that their professional purview should in-
clude checking prescriptions for interaction. See Eldridge & Smith, supra note 38, at
41 (citing Susan Headden et al., Danger at the Drug Store, U.S. News & World Re-
port, Aug. 26, 1996, at 46, 49). Perhaps pharmacists feel compelled to offer such
services in order to compete for customers. Nevertheless, the advertisements evi-
dence confidence that pharmacists can protect customers from avoidable interactions.
41. See David W. Hepplewhite, A Traditional Legal Analysis of the Roles and Dit-
ties of Pharmacists, 44 Drake L. Rev. 519, 530 (1996).
42. See generally Samuel H. Kalman & John F. Schlegel, Standards of Practice for
the Profession of Pharmacy, 19 Am. Pharmacy 22 (1979) (discussing the compilation
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provide the "cornerstone" for the future of pharmacy practice, the
Standards describe pharmacists' basic professional responsibilities. 3
The Standards' creators further intended to inform non-pharmacists,
such as government officials, third-party payors, the public, and even
other healthcare providers, about the comprehensive service of phar-
macy.4"
The Standards distinguish among the various tasks of the practice of
pharmacy, requiring specific conduct for each. In cases of self-
medication, for example, the pharmacist should interview and exam-
ine the patient, and in his "professional judgment" decide whether to
refer the patient for further examination' As part of "Patient Care
Functions," a pharmacist must decide whether or not to advise the pa-
tient of potential side effects by determining whether "potential exists
for a significant' drug interaction," and whether the benefit of ex-
plaining side effects outweighs the risk of doing so. 7 If it does, the
pharmacist's task is to determine an alternative regimen,' and to no-
tify the prescribing physician of his interaction with the patient.4 9
These tasks are wholly antagonistic to the traditional paradigm of
pharmacy, under which pharmacists were discouraged from ques-
tioning or supplanting the physician's orders.- This modern practice
of pharmacy is institutionally independent of the practice of medi-
cine,51 and pharmacists are increasingly required to exercise profes-
sional judgment independent from the prescribing physicians.5 De-
spite these developments in modern pharmacy practice, courts have
been reluctant to acknowledge pharmacists' contemporary role in the
drug-distribution system, and continue to impose a legal standard of
clerical accuracy only.
The next part of this Note discusses courts' refusal to classify phar-
macists as professionals for the purposes of negligence liability, thus
of the Standards).
43. See Kalman & Schlegel, supra note 41, at 22.
44. See id
45. See id at Responsibility No. 8(2), (6), & (7).
46. Other industry representatives have advanced similar but possibly more strin-
gent counseling standards, arguing that the pharmacist must warn the patient if he
knows of a risk that is "reasonably foreseeable" to the patient. See Brushwood,
Knowledge-Based Model, supra note 25, at 11-12.
47. See Kalman & Schlegel, supra note 41, § 3, at Responsibility Nos. 4 & 6(3).
48. See id. at Responsibility No. 4(5).
49. See id. at Responsibility No. 6(5). Responsibility No. 13 encourages the
pharmacist to communicate alternate treatment plans to the physician after evaluat-
ing the patient's data base. The Standards also include this task as an "Activity Re-
lated to Processing the Prescription." See id. § 2, at Responsibility No. 3.
50. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
51. See Brushwood, Knowledge-Based Model, supra note 25, at 16 (observing that
"[p]harmacists differ from most other nonphysician health care providers who act un-
der physicians' orders, such as nurses and various therapists, because pharmacists
have an independent practice not institutionally tied to the physician").
52- See infra Part II.B.2.
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denying them legal protections afforded to other "professionals." It
then examines the standards courts apply to pharmacists, from the
traditional standard of clerical accuracy to more recent innovations,
such as a limited-duty rule. It concludes with the academic response
to these approaches.
II. PHARMACISTS' STANDARD OF CARE
The standard of care applied to professionals in malpractice law has
typically not been extended to pharmacists. By failing to recognize
pharmacists as professionals, courts have instead ruled on the applica-
ble standard of care without deferring to industry practice. This part
first defines the standard of care applied to professionals and then
outlines the various standards of care that have been applied to phar-
macists by courts. Finally, this part considers the academic response
to courts' application of such standards.
A. The "Professionals"' Standard of Care in Malpractice
Plaintiffs in negligence actions must demonstrate that the defendant
owed the plaintiff a legal duty and that the defendant's conduct (or
lack thereof) breached that dutyi 3 While existence of a legal duty is
always predicated on the parties' relationship, in cases of malpractice,
the duty arises from the employment relationship.-' Courts measure
ordinary negligence defendants against a hypothetical reasonable per-
son in determining whether the defendant has met the appropriate
standard of care.55 Professional malpractice differs from ordinary
negligence in that the standard of care is determined by the skill and
diligence exercised in similar matters by other professionals of ordi-
nary competence. 6 The standard of care applicable to professionals
has been defined as follows: by accepting employment to give profes-
sional services a professional "impliedly agrees to use such skill, pru-
dence, and diligence as [similar professionals] of ordinary skill and ca-
pacity commonly possess and exercise in the performance of the tasks
which they undertake."57
53. See W. Page Keeton et al., Prosser & Keaton on the Law of Torts § 53, at 356
(5th ed. 1984).
54. See, e.g., Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr. et al., The Law and Ethics of Lawyering 175
(2d ed. 1994) (defining the first element of legal malpractice as "[a] duty of care aris-
ing from an attorney-client relationship or... some other showing... that a substan-
tial purpose of the attorney-client relationship was to influence or benefit the plain-
tiff" (footnote omitted)).
55. See Oliver Wendell Homes, Jr., The Common Law 108-10 (1881) (noting that
the law recognizes one standard of care owed by all, irrespective of temperament, in-
tellect, and education); 3 Fowler Harper et al., The Law of Torts 389-90 (2d ed. 1986)
(defining standard of care as conduct at least as cautious as that exercised by a rea-
sonably prudent person).
56. See Hazard, supra note 54, at 175.
57. Lucas v. Hamm, 364 P.2d 685, 689 (Cal. 1961). The Lucas court affirmed the
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Unlike ordinary cases of negligence, in which courts determine the
applicable standard of care based on the individual facts,-s courts give
greater, even exclusive, deference to industry custom in defining a
professional's standard of care.59 While the law imposes a heightened
duty of care on professionals, this burden is tempered by permitting
the profession to set its own standards of conduct.' ° Expert testimony
is therefore required as part of plaintiff's prima facie case to demon-
strate departure from the relevant professional standard of conduct.61
Courts' methods of defining a "professional" for purposes of mal-
practice is not clearly established." Courts, in deciding whether to af-
ford a vocation "professional" status, rely on many factors, including:
duration of education;63 licensing by the state in conjunction with edu-
cation;64 and independence of decision-making.65 Modem professions
are characterized by their ability to limit outside interference with the
administration of the profession.66 Commentators argue that the de-
terminative factor that courts should consider is adherence to an ethi-
cal code above that of other occupations, because these codes operate
to the benefit of the clients or customers who employ the profession-
als adhering to them.67 Professional codes of conduct demonstrate an
industry's concern for the welfare of its clients and bolster the profes-
sion's integrity by raising the quality of service accordingly. s Thus
members of professions that govern their standard of practice pursu-
ant to ethical codes should be recognized as professionals under negli-
dismissal of a complaint alleging that a lawyer caused plaintiff to lose S75,000 of an
inheritance because the lawyer misinterpreted the rule against perpetuities. See id. at
686-87. The court stated that "it would not be proper" to hold the defendant liable
because the rule was so confusing and difficult. The lawyer could not be liable for
every mistake or for erring on a judgment on which other lawyers would entertain
reasonable doubt. See id. at 689.
58. See The TJ. Hooper v. Northern Barge Corp., 60 F.2d 737,739 (2d Cir. 1932)
(noting that while evidence of custom is persuasive, "there are precautions so impera-
tive that even their universal disregard will not excuse their omission").
59. See Hazard, supra note 54, at 187.
60. See Robbins v. Footer, 553 F.2d 123, 126 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (defining applicable
standard of care for an obstetrician).
61. See id.
62. See generally Michael J. Polelle, Who's on First, and What's a Professional?, 33
U.S.F. L. Rev. 205, 207 (1999) (opining that courts should preserve the privileges of
professional malpractice by restricting its availability to professions that "govern
themselves as fiduciaries of their clients").
63. See e.g., Pierce v. AALL Ins., 531 So. 2d 84, 87 (Fla. 1988) (finding that a
"professional" may be determined by a four-year college degree).
64. See eg., Harrel v. Lusk, 439 S.E.2d 896, 898 (Ga. 1994) (requiring plaintiff to
attach expert affidavit to complaint in professional negligence action against pharma-
cist).
65. See eg., Matthews v. Walker, 296 N.E.2d 569, 571-72 (Ohio Ct. App. 1973)
(finding that a podiatrist has the independent-medical-discretion characteristic of a
professional, but that a nurse does not).
66. See Polelle, supra note 62, at 212.
67. See id. at 228-29.
68. See Rossell v. Volkswagen of Am., 709 P.2d 517,522 (Ariz. 1985) (en banc).
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gence law and permitted to establish their own applicable legal stan-
dard of care.
B. Approaches to Pharmacist Liability
This section examines the various approaches courts apply to de-
termine the liability of pharmacists. These approaches grapple with
the degree of skill and knowledge courts require pharmacists to em-
ploy in conducting their business. This section then considers the
scholarship on this issue, which criticizes courts' failure to articulate a
clear and consistent standard of liability for pharmacists.
1. The Traditional View: Clerical Accuracy
Courts traditionally require only that pharmacists perform with
clerical accuracy in filling prescriptions.69 Clerical accuracy means
that the prescription contains the intended medication free of con-
tamination from improper storage, and that correct and complete di-
rections are provided.70 Accordingly, traditional pharmacist negli-
gence claims allege that the pharmacist failed in one of four
obligations: to dispense the drug prescribed;71 to use due care in the
drug's preparation; to use proper methods in the compounding 2 proc-
ess; or to keep the drug free of infection from any adulterating foreign
substance.73
This traditional approach to liability assumes several things about
the role and responsibilities of the pharmacist. First, the pharmacist is
neither licensed nor qualified to advise customers about their pre-
scribed medication. 74 Second, patients rely on the skill of the physi-
69. See, e.g., Alison G. Myhra, The Pharmacist's Duty to Warn in Texas, 18 Rev.
Litig. 27, 33 (1999) (defining accuracy as the "bedrock function" of pharmacists).
70. See, e.g., People's Serv. Drug Stores, Inc. v. Somerville, 158 A. 12, 13-14 (Md.
1932) (holding pharmacist to these duties only); see also Brushwood, Duty Under
OBRA-90, supra note 37, at 475 (noting that the traditional role of the pharmacist has
been limited to providing the customer with the right drug, in the proper strength,
with accurate directions for use).
71. See, e.g., Tremblay v. Kimball, 77 A. 405, 408-09 (Me. 1910) (affirming a jury
verdict against a druggist for dispensing an incorrect drug, even though defendant ar-
gued that the mistake occurred because someone put the wrong pills in the storage
unit, and that he properly filled the prescription from this source without knowing of
the mistake).
72. The medical term "compounding" denotes the preparation of "[a] substance
composed of two or more units or parts combined in definite proportions by weight
and having specific properties of its own." Taber's Cyclopedic Medical Dictionary 430
(17th ed. 1993).
73. See McLeod v. W.S. Merrell Co., Div. of Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 174 So. 2d
736, 739 (Fla. 1965); see also Adkins v. Mong, 425 N.W.2d 151, 154 (Mich. Ct. App.
1998) (dismissing claim for failure to warn about addictive side effects); Batiste v.
American Home Prods., 231 S.E.2d 269, 275 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977) (rejecting the claim
that a pharmacist is liable for injuries in absence of actual knowledge of risk to cus-
tomer).
74. See Batiste, 231 S.E.2d at 274.
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cian, not the pharmacist, in deciding whether or when to take the
medication. 75 Lastly, the traditional view assumes that a pharmacist
cannot commit an error in the absence of an exercise of judgment. 6
Thus, a pharmacist should not use independent discretion in filling
prescriptions.
The traditional scope of pharmacist liability reflects the distinction
between "misfeasance" and "nonfeasance.""7 Under this distinction,
customers have a right to assume that a pharmacist, in filling a pre-
scription, exposes the customers to no new risk of injury.8 Thus, a
pharmacist who provides a drug other than that intended by the pre-
scribing doctor clearly exposes the customer to a new risk not previ-
ously present in the prescription. 9 In these situations, courts have lit-
tle difficulty in finding liability.0 In contrast, by failing to provide a
warning to customers about risks inherent in drug therapy, the drug-
gist simply fails to benefit the customer with his knowledge. The
pharmacist does not thereby place the customer in a worse position
than he found him."1 As a result, courts have typically refused to find
pharmacists liable for acts of nonfeasance8 2
Another rationale underlying the traditional paradigm is that es-
tablishing an obligation to warn compels the pharmacist to second-
guess each prescription a doctor orders to escape civil liability.s This
interference arguably violates the patient-physician relationship.'
Because the physician is familiar with the patient's individual condi-
tion, he alone should plan the patient's therapy and determine what
75. See id. at 275.
76. See Furnish, supra note 34, at 199.
77. See Keeton et al., supra note 53, § 56, at 373 (noting that the term "misfea-
sance" characterizes a defendant's action that creates a new risk to the plaintiff, while
"nonfeasance" means that he has left the plaintiff no worse off, but has only failed to
benefit him by the defendant's interference).
78. See Burke v. Bean, 363 S.W.2d 366,368 (Tex. Civ. App. 1962) (observing that
a customer, who is generally ignorant about medicines, rightfully relies on the drug-
gist, who holds himself out as having the particular knowledge, skill, and license to fill
prescriptions).
79. See, e.g., Taugher v. Ling, 187 N.E. 19,21 (Ohio 1933) (recognizing the com-
mon law liability of a druggist who, in error, sells a harmful drug in place of the one a
physician prescribed).
80. See, e.g., Tremblay v. Kimball, 77 A. 405, 409 (Me. 1910) (holding a pharma-
cist who supplied a drug different than that prescribed liable).
81. Actions based on nonfeasance have typically required some special relation-
ship between the parties, not merely a claim that the defendant could have, but did
not, take action to protect the plaintiff from an injury foreseeable to defendant. See
Harper v. Herman, 499 N.W.2d 472,474 (Minn. 1993).
82. See infra notes 90-117 and accompanying text.
83. See, e.g., Jones v. Irvin, 602 F. Supp. 399, 402 (S.D. I11. 1985) (rejecting plain-
tiff's claim that common law imposed a duty to warn customers about prescriptions in
excessive amounts, dosages, or possible contraindications).
84. See Batiste v. American Home Prods., 231 S.E.2d 269, 274 (N.C. Ct. App.
1977).
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potential side effects are relevant concerns for a particular patient. 85
Thus a general warning, issued by the pharmacist and possibly irrele-
vant to a specific customer, could confuse the customer and lead him
to doubt his physician's choice in therapy.
In jurisdictions applying traditional liability, claims alleging that a
pharmacist owes a duty proactively to take corrective measures are
simply dismissed.'s In North Carolina, for example, a complaint must
allege a failure in one of the four traditional obligations of pharmacy.8
Thus, in Batiste v. American Home Products, the plaintiff could not
proceed on the allegation that her pharmacist failed to warn her about
the many risks attendant to the use of an oral contraceptive drug.88
Florida's rule, set forth in Pysz v. Henry's Drug Store,89 exemplifies
the traditional view:
[A] supplier of drugs has no duty to fail or refuse to supply a cus-
tomer with drugs for which the customer has a valid and lawful pre-
scription from a licensed physician, nor any duty to warn said cus-
tomer of the fact that one using the prescribed drug for any period
of time could or would become addicted to the use thereof.., even
though the supplier of such drugs was aware of the fact that the cus-
tomer had developed a physical and psychological dependence and
addiction to the prescribed drugs.9°
The court rejected the opportunity to reexamine the pharmacist's duty
to warn, finding that only the physician has the obligation to know the
drug and properly monitor the patient's therapy.91
Similarly, in Jones v. Irvin,' the court held that Illinois negligence
law does not impose upon the pharmacist a duty to warn the cus-
tomer, or to notify the physician, that the drug is being prescribed in
85. See Eldridge v. Eli Lilly & Co., 485 N.E.2d 551,552-53 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
86. See, e.g., Jones, 602 F. Supp. 399, at 402 (holding that a pharmacist has no duty
to warn a customer of dangerous medications); Pysz v. Henry's Drug Store, 457 So. 2d
561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. 1984) (finding that pharmacist's failure to warn patient of addictive
propensities of drug did not constitute negligence); Batiste, 231 S.E.2d at 269 (holding
that a pharmacist is neither qualified nor licensed to advise customer).
87. See supra notes 71, 73 and accompanying text.
88. 231 S.E.2d 269,274 (N.C. Ct. App. 1977).
89. 457 So. 2d 561 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984).
90. Id. at 561-62. The appellate court affirmed the trial court's dismissal of the
claim despite serious factual allegations. See id. at 561. Steve Pysz received prescribed
Quaaludes for over nine years from the same pharmacist. See id. He claimed that the
defendant-pharmacist should have warned him of the addictive propensities of the
drug because defendant knew that using the drug for such a period of time would re-
sult in addiction. See id. He further alleged that the defendant in fact knew that he
had become addicted to the drug and continued to fill the prescription without taking
any corrective measures. See id. On appeal, Pysz argued that the trial court erred by
ignoring how drastically the pharmaceutical business had changed in the preceding
twenty years and that a pharmacist has greater knowledge than the physician of the
dangerous propensities of drugs. See id. at 562.
91. See id.
92. 602 F. Supp 399,402-03 (S.D. Ill. 1985).
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dangerous amounts, that the customer is over-medicated, or that the
various drugs in their prescribed quantities could cause adverse reac-
tions.93 In reaching its decision, the court examined precedent from
the past fifty years, and concluded that the "overwhelming majority of
recent state cases" imposed no duty to warn the customer. 9 The court
thus adopted the reasoning of the majority of courts in announcing the
respective duties of pharmacists, physicians, and even of patients. 5 In
addition, the court held that it is the physician's duty to know the
characteristics of the drug and the quantity to prescribe, and to moni-
tor the patient's dependence on the drug.9 The physician must also
elicit from the patient any other drugs the patient is taking, and the
patient has a duty to notify the physician of such usage.w Finally, the
physician must warn the patient about potential dangers associated
with taking the drug.98 Imposing a duty to warn, the court reasoned,
would compel pharmacists to second-guess each prescription they
were asked to fill in order to escape liability."
The Jones court considered a handful of cases that had imposed li-
ability on pharmacists and distinguished them from the complaint of
the plaintiff, Carole Jones.1°0 Jones had not alleged that the defendant
was familiar with her drug history," 1 that the pharmacist recom-
mended use of a nonprescription drug in conjunction with other
drugs,10 2 or that the pharmacist had provided a drug other than one
the physician intended.0 3 The court agreed that a pharmacist owes
the "'highest degree of prudence, thoughtfulness, and diligence,"' but
93. See id at 400 (dismissing claim of personal injuries and loss of consortium as a
result of excessive drug consumption). Georgia also adopted this rule in Walker v.
Jack Eckerd Corp., 434 S.E.2d 63, 67 (Ga. CL App. 1993). The Walker court observed
that Georgia's common law does not recognize malpractice in the absence of a physi-
cian-patient relationship. See id at 69.
94. Jones, 602 F. Supp. at 401 (citing Pysz v. Henry's Drug Store, 457 So. 2d 561
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)).
95. See id. at 401-02.
96. See id. at 402.
97. See id.
9& See id. The court also addressed the duty of the drug manufacturer, which is
satisfied when the manufacturer notifies the physician of potential side effects or pre-
cautions associated with the drug's use. See id.
99. See iU.
100. See id. at 401-03.
101. See i& at 400. But see Hand v. Krakowski, 453 N.Y.S.2d 121, 123 (App. Div.
1982) (holding that a druggist may be liable for failing to warn a customer of the pos-
sible side effects from mixing a drug with alcohol when the druggist knows that the
customer is an alcoholic).
102 See Jones, 602 F. Supp. at 400. But see Fuhs v. Barber, 36 P.2d 962, 964 (Kan.
1934) (finding a duty to warn a customer of side effects from mixing prescription and
nonprescription drugs when the druggist recommended use of the nonprescription
drug).
103. See Jones, 602 F. Supp. at 400. But see Jones v. Walgreen Co., 265 Ill. App.
308, 321-22 (1932) (holding a pharmacist liable for filling a prescription with a drug
other than the one prescribed because he could not read the prescription).
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concluded as a matter of law that the defendant had satisfied this duty
by correctly filling a valid prescription. 4 Under Jones, the pharma-
cist's only clear obligation is clerical accuracy.105
The clerical accuracy standard requires precision in all respects in
filling a prescription, and this requirement of accuracy applies even
when the pharmacist undertakes more than traditional obligations.' 6
Thus, if a pharmacist warns his customer about potential side effects,
or uses a computer to avoid dangerous drug interactions, he has an
obligation to do so accurately. °7 However, this expanded duty applies
only to the particular service provided. In Frye v. Medicare-Glaser
Corp.,108 the court refused to expand the scope of the pharmacist's
duty to warn because, as a practical matter, the pharmacist could not
warn against all possible side effects without overwhelming the cus-
tomer. 109 Imposition of such a duty would violate public policy be-
cause pharmacists would likely provide no warnings at all on labels."10
Under the Frye rule, a pharmacist has the option to inform a customer
about side effects that are common to the drug and generally inconse-
quential, such as drowsiness, so long as the warnings are accurate."'
Plaintiffs alleging that pharmacists have a duty to take corrective
measures other than warning customers about side effects have met
with similar results under the traditional view. The court in Eldridge
104. See Jones, 602 F. Supp. at 402-03 (quoting Jones, 265 Ill. App. at 315).
105. The court noted that had Ms. Jones alleged that the pharmacist was negligent
in filling the prescription by using the wrong drug, or by giving the wrong directions,
she clearly would have had a claim. See id. at 400. The court stated that its holding
was limited to the facts of the case, which did not include "side reactions, over de-
pendence, misuse, or restrictions on use, associated with non-prescribed drugs he dis-
penses." See id. at 403.
106. See supra note 23 and accompanying text.
107. See, e.g., Frye v. Medicare-Glaser Corp., 605 N.E.2d 557, 560 (Ill. 1992)
(holding that a pharmacist's duty to warn must comport with the level of services he
voluntarily undertakes to provide); Baker v. Arbor Drugs, Inc., 544 N.W.2d 727, 731
(Mich. Ct. App. 1996) (finding that a pharmacist who uses computer technology to
warn customers voluntarily assumes a duty of care to do so without error).
108. 605 N.E.2d 557 (Ill. 1992).
109. See id. at 560-61. The plaintiff in Frye claimed that the pharmacist should
have warned his customer about the dangerous interaction between Fiorinal, the drug
prescribed, and alcohol consumption. The interaction between them caused the cus-
tomer's death. See id. at 558.
110. See id. at 560. The defendant pharmacy had a computer program that pro-
vided general warnings about the drugs dispensed, and in this case, the computer did
issue a warning about alcohol consumption. See id. at 558-59. The pharmacist testi-
fied that she purposefully omitted the warning from the label because "it offended so
many people that [she] would think that they might drink." Id. at 559. Thus, the
pharmacist had discretion as to what warnings to include or omit. See id.
111. See id. at 560-61 (stating that if the defendant had instead given a completely
inaccurate warning, and had the customer followed the instruction, the pharmacist
would be liable for the customer's injury resulting from his negligent voluntary under-
taking). The court noted that potential warnings for use of the drug included every-
thing from flatulence to adverse effects during pregnancy. Therefore, customers
should rely on the prescribing physician for appropriate warnings. See id. at 561.
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v. Eli Lilly & Co."2 held that a pharmacist has no common law duty to
take corrective action for prescriptions of excessive quantities.n 3 The
plaintiff asserted that because the pharmacist has greater knowledge
than the physician of the propensities of drugs, the pharmacist should
be under a duty to act as a "safety supervisor" to monitor prescrip-
tions.1 The court disagreed, opining that imposition of a duty to cor-
rect would cause the pharmacist to inject himself into the physician-
patient relationship, requiring that he familiarize himself with the pa-
tient's condition and practice medicine without a license.'" The court
observed that the appropriate drug dosage is personal to each patient
and his condition; what is excessive for one patient may be reasonable
for another."6 Acknowledging the existence of a risk to the customer,
but precluding the opportunity for a jury finding of negligence, the
court determined that the customer was entitled neither to the benefit
nor consequence of the pharmacist's judgment, but only to that of the
physician."7
The clerical-accuracy standard has thus functioned to preclude in-
jured plaintiffs from recovery in situations in which a pharmacist
could have prevented the harm. At the same time, it has sheltered
pharmacists from liability and lowered the bar on their professional
duties and the public's expectations.
2. Alternative Approaches to Pharmacist Liability
Many courts now recognize that pharmacists owe a greater duty of
care than simply clerical accuracy. New approaches to pharmacists'
liability assert that pharmacists must apply their skill and knowledge
to prevent unnecessary injury to customers. Courts examining the le-
gal duties of a pharmacist focus on the relationship between the
pharmacist and customer, the foreseeablility of injury, and public pol-
icy issues. 8 The policy concerns that courts weigh are preservation of
the physician-patient relationship, prevention of drug related injuries,
112. 485 N.E.2d 551 (Ill. App. Ct. 1985).
113. See id. at 554-55. The court dismissed the plaintiffs claim that Brown Drug &
Company negligently filled a prescription for Darvon, from which the decedent over-
dosed. See id at 552, 555. The plaintiff argued that the pharmacist should have
warned the physician that the prescription presented a risk to his patient or refused to
fill the prescription. See id. at 552.
114. See id. at 553.
115. See id.
116. See id.
117. See id. at 552-53.
11& See e.g., Jones v. Irvin, 602 F. Supp. 399, 402 (S.D. Ill. 1985) (noting the im-
portance of preserving the patient-physician relationship from interference by the
pharmacist); Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 642 N.E.2d 514, 517-18 (Ind. 1994)
(holding that imposition of a duty to refuse to fill a valid prescription is warranted be-
cause the pharmacist-customer relationship already gives rise to a duty, the injury was
foreseeable, and public policy favors corrective action that prevents drug abuse).
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and avoidance of unnecessary costs.119 Application of expanded li-
ability arises from courts' recognition that intervention by pharma-
cists, particularly in situations in which a prescription contains an ob-
vious error, may prevent injuries, and that this measure of protection
outweighs other policy concerns, such as preserving the physician-
patient relationship. 120
Courts have adopted different approaches to redefining pharma-
cists' standard of care. In some jurisdictions, courts have taken a very
active role in establishing the appropriate standard of care for pur-
poses of civil litigation.121  For example, courts have affirmed a jury
verdict against a pharmacist who correctly filled a valid prescription,122
and imposed an affirmative obligation on a pharmacist to refuse to fill
a prescription for addictive drugs for a patient seeking excessive re-
fills.123 Other jurisdictions have refused to rule on the appropriate
standard of care, rendering it a factual question for jury determina-
tion.124
a. The Limited-Duty Rule
Jurisdictions adopting a "limited-duty" rule require that pharma-
cists be alert for patent inadequacies that appear on the face of pre-
scriptions.1 5 Such errors can include an obviously excessive or lethal
dose, inadequate directions, and known contraindications. 126
Pennsylvania adopted a limited-duty rule in Riff v. Morgan Phar-
macy,127 the first case ever to affirm a verdict against a pharmacist for
filling a valid prescription. The court imposed a duty on pharmacists
to take corrective measures when presented with an obviously inade-
quate prescription, if filling the prescription would create a substantial
119. See Jones, 602 F. Supp. at 402; Hooks, 642 N.E.2d at 518.
120. See Hooks, 642 N.E.2d at 517-18.
121. See id. at 519.
122. See Riff v. Morgan Pharmacy, 508 A.2d 1247, 1248 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1986)
(holding a pharmacist liable for dispensing a dangerous prescription drug with incom-
plete directions); infra Part II.B.2.a.
123. See Hooks, 642 N.E.2d at 519; infra Part II.B.2.b.
124. See Lasley v. Shrake's Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129, 1130
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380, 386 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990);
infra Part II.B.2.c.
125. See, e.g., Riff, 508 A.2d at 1248 (holding a pharmacist liable for dispensing a
medication with incomplete directions); McKee v. American Home Prods., 782 P.2d
1045, 1052 (Wash. 1989) (en banc) (observing that a pharmacist has a duty to be alert
for, and to take corrective measures to prevent, patent errors in a prescription).
126. See McKee, 782 P.2d at 1053. The plaintiff in McKee did not allege that she
was injured by a prescription containing such a patent error and the court decided
against her summarily. See id. at 1055-56. The McKee court nevertheless used the
case to set the rule in Washington that a pharmacist has a duty to protect his custom-
ers from patent errors. See id. at 1053.
127. 508 A.2d 1247 (Pa. Super Ct. 1986).
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risk of serious harm to the customer.12s The court held that the phar-
macist's failure to take corrective measures in the face of inadequate
directions--either by refusing to refill or to verify the prescription
with the physician-was negligent, and the proximate cause of the cus-
tomer's injury. 29 Accordingly, the pharmacist should have recognized
the erroneous omission in the directions and the serious threat of
over-use, and should have taken corrective action."m The court's
holding, however, requires only a minimal exercise of judgment by the
pharmacist, because the error must be objectively obvious, and limits
the scope of liability by imposing a gravity-of-harm element.ul By
allowing the plaintiff to introduce evidence of industry practice, the
court deferred to the judgment of the pharmaceutical community to
expand the scope of a pharmacist's responsibilities. "1 Z
Subsequent courts have announced a limited-duty rule in pharma-
cist liability cases without actually finding that the defendant's con-
duct violated the standard of care. In McKee v. American Home
Products,33 a Washington court refused to expand pharmacist liability
by creating a common law duty to warn customers about potential
side effects.M The court did, however, state that at a minimum, a
pharmacist has a duty to be alert for patent errors in a prescription,
and to take corrective measures if necessary. 13 Such errors include:
"obvious lethal dosages, inadequacies in the instructions, known con-
traindications, or incompatible prescriptions."' The court affirmed
the defendant's summary judgment because the complaint did not al-
lege that the pharmacist filled a prescription containing a patent er-
rorm7
Louisiana adopted a limited-duty rule in Gassen v. East Jefferson
General Hospital,3' and subsequently reaffirmed its position in Guil-
128 See Riff, 508 A.2d at 1252. The plaintiff suffered serious and permanent leg
injuries from over-use of a migraine suppository prescription. See id. at 1249. The
physician and pharmacist provided inadequate directions because they did not alert
plaintiff to the safe maximum dose. See id. at 1252-53.
129. See id. at 1252.
130. See id.
131. See id. at 1250-51
132. See id. at 1253-54 ("If the consensus of the medical community is that a safety
net of overlapping responsibilities is necessary to serve the best interests of patients, it
is not for the judiciary to dismantle the safety net and leave patients at the peril of one
man's human frailty.").
133. 782 P.2d 1045 (Wash. 1989) (en banc).
134. See id. at 1055-56.
135. See id. at 1053.
136. Id. (emphasis in original) (footnotes omitted).
137. See id. at 1056. Elaine McKee alleged that her pharmacist had a duty to warn
her about the adverse side effects of long-term use of a prescription drug when that
pharmacist filled the prescription for ten years. See id at 1046.
138. 628 So. 2d 256 (La. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that "a pharmacist has a limited
duty to inquire or verify from the prescribing physician clear errors or mistakes in the
prescription").
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lory v. Dr. X.19 The Guillory court held that, in addition to an obliga-
tion of accuracy, a pharmacist has a duty to warn the patient or to no-
tify the physician if the prescription calls for an excessive dosage or
has an obvious error on its face that presents a substantial risk of harm
to the patient. 14 The court nevertheless affirmed summary judgment
for the defendant-pharmacist. 14'
A limited-duty rule provides plaintiffs with some measure of protec-
tion by requiring a pharmacist's vigilance, but it fails to acknowledge
the full potential of a pharmacist to analyze potential dangers present
in prescriptions.
b. A Judicially Created Minimum Standard of Care
The Supreme Court of Indiana created a common law minimum
standard of care for pharmacists in Hooks SuperX, Inc. v. McLaugh-
lin42 by holding that a pharmacist may be legally obligated to refuse
to fill a validly issued prescription.143 The Hooks court determined the
duty of a pharmacist under ordinary negligence standards, examining
the relationship between the parties, the foreseeability of the injury,
and public policy. 44 It noted that the relationship between a pharma-
cist and customer gives rise to a duty to correctly fill the prescrip-
tion.145 The court justified its finding based on a customer's expecta-
tion that her pharmacist has expertise upon which she can rely.146 It
also observed that the relationship between a pharmacist and cus-
tomer exists independently of the physician-patient relationship.147
The Hooks court relied on the foreseeability of the injury to deter-
mine that a person who consumes addictive drugs will become ad-
dicted.148 It also considered the public policy concerns of deterring
drug abuse and avoiding unnecessary health costs. 149 The court con-
cluded that the possibility that pharmacists could prevent drug addic-
tion simply by exercising their professional judgment outweighed con-
139. 679 So. 2d 1004, 1010 (La. Ct. App. 1996).
140. See id.
141. See id. Ms. Guillory's complaint alleged that the defendant provided her de-
ceased husband with dangerous quantities and combinations of drugs, but not that the
prescription contained excessive dosages or obvious errors. See id.
142. 642 N.E.2d 514 (Ind. 1994).
143. See id. at 518. Plaintiff McLaughlin became addicted to propoxyphene, the ac-
tive chemical in Darvocet, after taking the drug for more than five years. See id. at
516. He was treated for addiction three times during that period and finally at-
tempted suicide. See id. McLaughlin, his wife, and family sued the pharmacy for inju-
ries resulting from the attempt, alleging that the pharmacist should not have contin-
ued to fill the prescription. See id.
144. See id. at 517-18.
145. See id. at 517.
146. See id.
147. See id.
148. See id.
149. See id. at 518.
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cerns regarding interference in the doctor-patient relationship.'" In
regard to increased costs, the court noted only that most pharmacists,
including the defendant, already use computer systems that can pro-
tect their customers against harmful interactions.51 Therefore, the
court found an extension of a duty to refuse to fill addictive drugs to
patients seeking excessive refills did not increase the cost of providing
medications.u 2
Turning to the question of the appropriate standard of care, the
Hooks court applied traditional negligence standards and held that a
pharmacist "must exercise that degree of care that an ordinarily pru-
dent pharmacist would under the same or similar circumstances."'53
In finding that the defendant-pharmacist breached the standard of
care, the court relied on the frequency of the customer's refills, the
addictive nature of the drug dispensed, and the pharmacist's ability to
access the patient's history.Y'
By holding that a pharmacist has a duty to refuse to fill a valid pre-
scription under these circumstances, Hooks imposed on pharmacists
an obligation to monitor their customers' addiction-an obligation
that has traditionally rested with physicians. The holding thus ac-
knowledges pharmacists' ability to use their professional judgment to
benefit their customers. The court did not, however, afford the de-
fendant-pharmacist the legal protections afforded to other profession-
als, such as deferring to a standard set by expert testimony.
3. The Academic Response
Academics have criticized courts for failing to create or to establish
precedent that recognizes a broadened duty of care for pharmacists1 55
Academics consistently chastise courts for their unwillingness to ac-
knowledge the skill and expertise possessed by pharmacists.'-' This
refusal results in a failure to acknowledge the potential role in patient
care that pharmacists can, and often do, play. Most commentators
posit that courts must eventually accept and apply a higher standard
of care, though scholars disagree on whether that time has come, and
what that standard should entail.157
150. See id at 519.
151. See id.
15Z See id
153. Id.
154. See id
155. See, eg., Brushwood, Knowledge-Based Model, supra note 25, at 4 (presenting
four articles that criticize judicial reluctance to expand pharmacists' duties, in spite of
his own assertion that "legal developments should reflect changes in professional
practice, not create them").
156. See, eg., Myhra, supra note 23, at 82 (opining that "the common law has been
slow to recognize the expertise of pharmacists").
157. Compare Brushwood, Duty Under OBRA-90, supra note 37, at 509 (recom-
mending that courts consider the federal OBRA-90 as a minimum standard of phar-
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Some academics have suggested an approach to the expanded role
of the modem pharmacist that conflicts with basic tort principles.
This proposed standard for the pharmacist's "new duty" uses capacity
to determine responsibility.1 58 Under this view, pharmacists, by em-
ploying their knowledge and professional judgment to do whatever is
reasonably possible to prevent drug-related injury, meet customers'
expectations that risks associated with drug therapy "will be mini-
mized whenever possible." 159 Accordingly, commentators argue that
courts should adopt the standard of pharmacy practice enacted by
Congress in OBRA-90 as the minimal industry standard in determin-
ing whether to hold pharmacists accused of negligence liable 60 This
adoption would create an industry-wide obligation to screen prescrip-
tions, to maintain patient records, and to offer to counsel patients
about prescriptions. 161
Presumably, in applying the OBRA-90 standards, courts would im-
pose a common law obligation that mirrors the federal statutory re-
quirements. Courts would thus hold pharmacists liable upon a show-
ing that they have failed to screen, or offer to educate, a customer
about a particular prescription.1 62 The main proponent of this ap-
proach identifies OBRA-90 as a source of authority for pharmacists to
use in capitalizing on their "emerging ability," and claims that it has
"empowered pharmacists to use their full potential as health care pro-
fessionals." 63  This commentator does not identify what prior re-
straints prevented pharmacists from voluntarily expanding their re-
sponsibilities-though this reluctance may have been due to the threat
of negligence exposure, or by impracticability.16
The flaw in this approach is that it would apply to pharmacists a
macy practice for purposes of negligence actions, but opining that the documentation
requirement is unrealistic because pharmacists currently lack the technological sup-
port to create and maintain comprehensive medical records) and Brushwood, Knowl-
edge-Based Model, supra note 25, at 60 (observing that some day pharmacists will
practice without being limited by physician predominance, but "that day has not yet
arrived"); with Myhra, supra note 23, at 33, 83 (suggesting that current state and fed-
eral statutes may compel Texas courts to apply a standard of care that includes an ob-
ligation to warn customers about potential risks associated with drug therapy).
158. See Brushwood, Professional Capabilities, supra note 24, at 448.
159. See id.
160. See Brushwood, Duty under OBRA-90, supra note 37, at 476.
161. See 42 U.S.C. § 1396r-8(g) (1994); Brushwood, Duty under OBRA-90, supra
note 37, at 476.
162. See Brushwood, Duty under OBRA-90, supra note 37, at 485-86. The main
proponent of this approach does not encourage courts to impose a requirement with
respect to documentation of patient records, as he observes that this standard does
"not yet reflect the reality of the contemporary pharmacy workplace." Id. at 509.
163. See id. at 485.
164. See Sheryl Gay Stolberg, The Boom in Medications Brings Rise in Fatal Risks,
N.Y. Times, June 3, 1999, at Al (observing that mistakes in the practice of pharmacy
occur because pharmacists are extremely overworked, as their profits depend on the
quantity of prescriptions dispensed).
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standard of care created by the legislature, rather than a standard cre-
ated by the industry itself. The next part argues that contrary to judi-
cially created standards of care, or standards created by the legislature
or presented by legal critics, courts should instead hold pharmacists to
a professional's standard of care and defer to the pharmaceutical in-
dustry to determine what conduct breaches that standard.
I. THE PHARMAcEUTcAL INDUSTRY'S OWN STANDARD OF CARE
This part argues that courts should treat pharmacists as profession-
als in negligence cases, thus permitting them to employ their profes-
sional judgment to benefit their customers without exposing them-
selves to the harsh uncertainty of judicially created standards of care.
By permitting pharmacists to be judged according to industry-
established standards, courts can move beyond their traditional pater-
nalism and acknowledge the active role pharmacists play in-patient
care.
No one refutes that pharmacists owe a duty of reasonable care to
their customers. The existence of a legal duty by a pharmacist or any
other actor does not depend solely on the alleged conduct in a par-
ticular controversy, but rather on the relationship between the par-
ties.165 As Prosser explains, in negligence cases the duty owed is al-
ways the same-to comply with the standard of conduct reasonable in
proportion to the apparent risk of injury.'" The conduct that satisfies
this duty is a factual question,167 and should be determined by the trier
of fact. Were courts to treat pharmacists as professionals, the answer
to this factual question would derive from industry standards that re-
flect the degree of care practiced by pharmacists generally.' 6'
Judge Learned Hand created a formula for ordinary negligence
cases to aid juries in determining what conduct constitutes negli-
gence:169 the probability of injury, multiplied by the gravity of that in-
jury, is greater than the burden of preventing the injury, then the de-
fendant assumes the burden of taking steps to prevent injury and will
be liable if the plaintiff is injured.70 Judge Hand's formula is relevant
by example to demonstrate the analysis that pharmacists might make
if the law permitted them to establish their own standard of conduct.
It recognizes that personal choice will effect the perceived importance
of each factor when weighing predictability, gravity of harm and bur-
den of prevention against one another. Thus, the formula is best ap-
165. See, e.g., Keeton et al., supra note 53, at 356 (defining "duty" in terms of "the
relation between individuals which imposes upon one a legal obligation for the bene-
fit of the other," and specifically, to a particular plaintiff).
166. See id
167. See id
16& See Polelle, supra note 62, at 206 & nn. 6-7.
169. See United States v. Carroll Towing Co., 159 F.2d 169,173 (2d Cir. 1947).
170. See id.
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plied by the members of a jury, not by the court, because preferences
weighed by the jury members will reflect commonly accepted stan-
dards.171 If the balance between these variables clearly establishes
that the defendant bears the burden of avoiding the injury, however,
the court may impose liability through summary judgment.
In the context of pharmacist liability, the proper inquiry is whether
that risk of injury outweighs the potential dangers of taking corrective
action, not whether the risk and gravity of harm outweigh the burden
on the defendant. For example, if presented with a prescription for a
poison, a pharmacist may have an obligation to verify the prescription
with the physician.173 Imposing such a risk-benefit analysis requires
the pharmacist to exercise judgment, and cannot be reconciled with
the traditional role of pharmacists. 74
Pharmacists cannot even err on the side of safety. If they affirma-
tively accept suggested and expansive responsibilities, and give their
customers every benefit of their skill and unique position in the
healthcare field, they actually expose themselves to a greater risk of
liability than does a neighbor-pharmacist practicing according to the
traditional paradigm. 5 Whereas the traditional pharmacist may be
liable only for mistakes in filling prescriptions, and perhaps for failing
to act, proactive pharmacists incur an obligation to use reasonable
care in all aspects of their practice, and will be liable for injuries they
caused. Thus, they increase their own exposure to liability, and un-
necessarily so: if pharmacists' negligence liability reflected industry
practice, all pharmacists would be held to identical standards.176
A minority of jurisdictions refuse to hold pharmacists to a judicially
created standard of care because doing so would confuse the concepts
of "duty" and "standard of care."'7 The court in Lasley v. Shrake's
Country Club Pharmacy'78 held that pharmacists have a duty to con-
form their conduct to that of reasonable pharmacists in similar cir-
cumstances.'79 The court recognized that pharmacists, as profession-
171. See Conway v. O'Brien, 111 F.2d 611,612 (2d Cir. 1940).
172. See Carroll Towing, 159 F.2d at 171.
173. See People's Serv. Drug Stores, Inc. v. Somerville, 158 A. 12, 14 (Md. 1932).
This decision, however, warns against the possible injury a pharmacist could cause to
multiple customers if he refused to fill prescriptions calling for "unusual remedies."
Id. at 13.
174. For a discussion of the traditional role of pharmacists' liability, see supra notes
20-26 and accompanying text.
175. See supra notes 20-26.
176. The similarity of the standards applied would be limited by the locality rule,
which requires that the testimony used to determine a professional's standard of care
come from an expert practicing in the same region. See Polelle, supra note 62, at 206.
177. See Lasley v. Shrake's Country Club Pharmacy, Inc., 880 P.2d 1129, 1132
(Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); Dooley v. Everett, 805 S.W.2d 380, 384 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1990).
178. 880 P.2d 1129 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994).
179. See id. at 1132-34. The plaintiff alleged that the pharmacist owed him a duty
to warn either the customer or his physician about the dangers of long-term use of the
prescribed drug in combination with other drugs. See id. at 1131.
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als, must be held to a higher standard of care than defendants in ordi-
nary negligence actions.'80 Because expert testimony is required to
determine the applicable standard in professional negligence actions,
summary judgment is precluded in the absence of such testimony.'8'
Contrary to Lasley, which acknowledged that both the industry and
the public benefit by judicial characterization of pharmacists as pro-
fessionals, courts typically create a shield of liability for pharmacists to
act below an appropriate standard of care by limiting findings to case-
by-case analyses. Such holdings thus fail to deter preventable harm to
pharmacy customers. This has the paradoxical effect of protecting
pharmacists from legal liability but refusing to acknowledge their skill
and acumen in administering to patients. Courts can end the confu-
sion surrounding pharmacists' standard of care in negligence law by
accepting pharmacists as professionals, and by allowing claims against
them to proceed as any other malpractice claim. This approach would
permit the fact-finder to evaluate the relevant standard of care based
on expert testimony regarding industry practice, and to determine
whether that standard has been met.Y Holding pharmacists to a
standard of "professional" negligence will end judicial paternalism
toward pharmacists and their responsibilities toward patients. At the
same time, courts would expand protections for the drug-consuming
public.
CONCLUSION
The public and the healthcare industry alike would be best served
by a judiciary that reflects and perceives changes in professions such
as pharmacy, which has expanded its role in patients' healthcare be-
yond the confines of traditional pill-counting and distribution. Phar-
macists have demonstrated their ability to use professional judgment,
independent of prescribing physicians, to protect customers from
avoidable drug-related injuries. They have further demonstrated their
willingness to govern the integrity of the industry by creating and fol-
lowing Standards of Practice1 3 that describe the industry's obligation
to its clients. By deferring to the profession to govern its appropriate
standard of practice, courts would encourage pharmacists, and other
professionals, to strive for standards of care most beneficial to the
public.
180. See id. at 1132.
181. See id. The court reversed the trial court's award of summary judgment to the
defendant, noting that the trial court improperly refused to consider excerpts from the
American Pharmaceutical Association Standards of Practice. See id. at 1134.
182- See supra Part H.
183. See Kalman & Schlegel, supra note 41.
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